Somalia is made up of many different territories with different political allegiances dominated by clan structures and facing a constant complex humanitarian crisis. This results in the International Community mixing its political interests with its humanitarian agenda. Insecurity severely hampers access in many parts, making it difficult to implement and monitor humanitarian responses. International humanitarian actors need to revisit their two decades' old strategy and invest more in working with local agencies to deliver aid. Local humanitarian actors need to take courageous humanitarian leadership with full accountability and transparency. Many international donors often appear to give priority to security and transparency over humanitarian action to save lives. 
This analysis has taken into account work already produced by Oxfam in Somalia, as well as other studies and reports done externally to Oxfam. At the same time it has used a critical perspective to question certain assumptions that otherwise may not allow fresh thinking.
The methodology applied follows this logic setting: The guiding methodology has been termed "HUCOCA" (Humanitarian Country Capacities Analysis methodology), specifically developed for this exercise by the consultant. 28 organisational interviews were conducted including local and international NGOs, as well as international and Government agencies (see Annex 1 for reference). Also specific practices developed by Oxfam and its partners, such as the Somali Civil Society Initiative Support (SOCSIS) programme, have been explored to enrich the analysis. 
Presence
South Central.
All country.
All country with exception of some militia controlled areas.
All around the county.
Mainly in South
Central, some presence elsewhere.
Relevance
High in political terms.
Medium in delivery terms.
Low in political terms.
Very high in delivery terms.
Low in coordination terms.
Medium coordination.
Very relevant within Somali society.
Very high delivery.
Low in coordination.
High in Humanitarian Terms. ICRC keeps distance from UN and other actors to preserve its neutrality.
High in delivery terms.
High in humanitarian access.
Highly influential on INGOs' programmes through funding conditionality.
HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
We will not repeat here the country context analysis that can be found in several other locations. Nevertheless some key points should be highlighted in order to understand the content of this report, these are:
•
The extreme fragility of the state since 1991.
•
The internal conflict and the realities among the three main differentiated regions and the presence of militia groups in significant areas of South Central Somalia.
The extreme low human development indicators translated in very low ratios of educational enrolment, income below $2 per day for the majority of the population and some of the lowest health indicators across the world.
The lack of humanitarian access and insecurity in large areas of South Central Somalia.
The influential dominant role and vast presence of UN agencies and its complex humanitarian and diplomatic machinery.
The vulnerability of livelihoods (crops and livestock grazing) dependent on rain cycles.
The pastoral life of many Somali people and the traditions associated with this way of life are important.
The chronic food shortages that have affected the country in recent decades.
The growing process of urbanisation, with little urban planning for growth and service provision.
The enormous impact that the Somalia Diaspora has in the economy of the country and in its politics.
The strong role that clans play in Somali society.
The highly influential role that religion has in Somali life.
The growing interest of Turkey, China and Gulf countries in the country and its natural resources.
Humanitarian actors need to move beyond diplomatic debates around international recognition of States, to centre their humanitarian action into real existing political and social structures within which to support and promote humanitarian capacities to save lives.
HUMANITARIAN CAPACITY GLOBAL somali CAPACITIES
Taking into account the premises exposed above, below is a summary of the global country contextual analysis and a synthesis of organisational capacities per region: South Central, Somaliland and Puntland.
The global contextual analysis has been done by enquiring and exploring three main blocks: society strength, state and politics, country infrastructure. Each one of these has been subdivided in areas of interest as follows: Recognition of the role of these agencies is more theoretical than practical.
Dispute among different clans is a feature of recent history .
There is a rapid growing trend to urbanisation and loosing traditional pastoralist culture and ways of life. This affects poverty levels, unemployment among young people and sometimes conflict in urban areas. In South Central Somalia the issue may not be so much about the humanitarian capacity available, which might be good enough, but it is about the possibility to deploy those capacities effectively and with security. On the other hand it is widely accepted that the Federal Government institutions have an extremely limited capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance or manage DRR programmes, although there are assigned departments within the government for this purpose, such as DMA. 
Capacity per block

Organisational Humanitarian Capacities in South Central Somalia
This organisational humanitarian capacity analysis in South Central Somalia covers more detail on State and Local NGO actors and provides brief information on the rest of the humanitarian actors.
Somalia Disaster Management Agency (DMA):
This is an official agency set by the FGS to manage disasters. It is an entity with a certain degree of autonomy at operational level although still under the political supervision of the Ministry of Interior and Federalism. Its mandate is very broad, from coordination to prevention, response and recovery. The DMA abides to a set of values of no discrimination, priority to those most vulnerable and dignity. They are aware of international humanitarian values of impartiality, independence, etc., but they inevitably have to operate under the political framework under which they are created.
Financial capacity is very low, dependent on donors for any programme. Management systems are still basic and not able to cope with complex programmes. Likewise human resource management is still at a very early stage with about 25 staff at the time of writing of which five are seconded by IOM for a short period of time to work on profiling of IDPs. Currently there is no surge capacity and as of September 2014 they did not have established agreements with other ministries or entities to second people when required.
Logistical capacity is minimal but it is intending to open five small reference offices in South Central Somalia. It has a basic strategic plan but there is recognition that great support will be required to have more analysis and strategising capacity, as well as capacity to translate these strategies into operational plans and specific tools for delivery. They have a monitoring and evaluation unit within the agency although it has limited operational capacity. The Agency's organisational structure is basic with some assigned units on administration, IDPs and monitoring and evaluation. A stronger structure should be developed to cover the basic areas of work that the DMA is supposed to attend to.
Figure 2b
The DMA pays high attention to coordination with other agencies including the UN and this is managed directly by the chair of the Agency. In terms of communications it produces quarterly reports and regular newsletters, but lacks an advanced communication system utilising the internet. The DMA does not have institutional risk management within its own organisation, making it vulnerable to any threat that may affect them such as loss of data.
In terms of approach DMA is aware of gender and rights based approaches but its translation to practical work is still to be developed. It has a good understanding of conflict sensitivity as well. It is starting to implement some DRR programmes with the EU, but still at an early stage.
An HIV-AIDS sensitive lens is not applied in its working approach.DMA has no specialised capacity in any cluster although some individuals do have some expertise in working with IDPs and on Food Security. Humanitarian standards such as Sphere or HAP are not known, neither implemented by the DMA.
In terms of volume, DMA is still a small organisation with limited resources at all levels, limited developed policies and strategies and a geographical outreach limited to areas in FGS control.
The DMA's capacity profile is as follows: 
Attitudes.
• Most NGOs have a strong sense of commitment.
• They have clarity on the dual mandate: humanitarian and development.
• • Most NGOs have HR management procedures.
• There are some specialised humanitarian staff with the LNGOs.
• Most organisations show strong personal leadership.
• There is little questioning about how their mandate should evolve in the new changing context. Mainly it is new NGOs bringing new approaches to this.
• Difficulty of fundraising and lack of diversity of funds is common and a critical problem to all LNGOs.
• Dependency on UN Agency funds is a common pattern among LNGO.
• There is growing concern about the need for increased financial accountability, particularly in South Central.
• HR development and retention of staff is very difficult.
• There is a high turnover of humanitarian staff within LNGOs.
• International NGO and UN Agencies compete for qualified people with Local NGOs.
• NGOs' leadership is mainly dominated by men.
• • South Central NGOs are good at making timely decisions and moving forward response programmes.
• Most NGOs have standard Strategic Plans.
• NGOs are generally good at traditional programme management and reporting.
• There are governance structures and management structures in place, with quite detailed developed manuals on procedures of different management areas: finances, HR, Procurement etc.
• LNGO have good networking capacity with international NGOs, agencies and Diaspora.
• Networking among LNGOs is made on ad-hoc basis.
• Most NGOs have limited logistical capacity although this varies enormously from organisation to organisation.
• Despite LNGOs' good time management, donors' slowness retards LNGO responses.
• Most NGOs have weak capacity to do contextual analysis, strategising and translating this into effective institutional planning.
• Knowledge management is a weak point as the M&E systems are often not translated into institutional knowledge management.
• Some of these manuals are standard and not updated.
• There are not powerful strategic networks of LNGO that could impact on shaping the humanitarian agenda. 16. Institutional resilience.
Cluster
1.7
2.1
1.3
• There is great awareness of the need of good communication and advocacy strategies and tools.
• Few NGOs have good communication tools and strategies.
• Most NGOs are aware and try to apply Sphere standards.
• Some NGOs have data protection mechanisms.
• In practice this is one of the weakest areas declared by most LNGOs.
• Sphere standards implementation seems to be a bit loose and not well monitored.
• There is not consciousness of Institutional Risk Management in most LNGOs.
• Hand over in leadership roles is rare. 1. Gender approach. • NGOs are aware of gender issues in humanitarian work.
• Almost all organisations have some degree of sectoral expertise and do participate in cluster coordination meetings.
• Almost all NGOS show a good understanding and practice of conflict sensitivity.
• Good understanding of Resilience and DRR concepts as part of Humanitarian action.
• Gender does not emerge as a spontaneous priority or relevant topic for most LNGOs.
• Most organisations work in the same sectors: WASH and Livelihood.
• Level of specialisation seems to be low.
• Rights based approach is only adopted in practice by few organisations, most are oriented to a needs based approach.
• There is little evidence of a sustained effort by LNGOs doing DRR and Resilience programmes.
• Almost totally ignored in the LNGO's humanitarian interventions.
• Seems to be a taboo issue in some places. • There are a large number of NGOs operating in South Central Somalia and some of them with a significant volume.
• Some LNGOs are able to work with local communities and reach difficult to access areas.
• Information provided by LNGOs does not show a coherent picture of the ratio of size versus impact or targeted population served.
• There are limited sustained investments of LNGOs.
• Short term programmes and dependency on big donors' conditions their capacity in the medium / long term.
• There is a strong limitation on the availability of qualified HR across the organisations.
• Each organisation has a limited number of geographical areas of intervention.
SOMALILAND
Somaliland claims status as an independent State with all its powers, institutional systems and tools in place without international recognition.
Security is quite acceptable, Somaliland lives in a tense calm with its neighbour Puntland with whom it disputes territories of Sanaag and Sool provinces.
Despite the Somaliland's Government official stance that the country is in a development phase, the reality is that the country still requires humanitarian assistance and DRR programmes.
Somaliland capacity and humanitarian access is the highest in the Somali territories, but at the same time humanitarian needs in Somaliland are the lowest of the territories. The agency is under the direct supervision of the President of Somaliland and has a fully developed legal framework which defines its mandate functions and accountability.
The leadership style of the agency has to evolve according to the new challenges that NERAD will confront in the near future so that more people within NERAD share greater responsibilities to ensure the continuous effective engagement of NERAD with the rest of humanitarian actors.
There is a lack of capacity in terms of human and material resources, and in terms of effective influence in the humanitarian sector.
The legal architecture on which NERAD is built could be more effective within the seven ministries chaired by the vice president for DRM in which NERAD plays secretariat role, if they had more resources and technical capacities to influence the agenda of the DRM office. 
Local NGOs in Somaliland
The analysis of Local NGOs working in Somaliland is based on the aggregated assessment made to several LNGOs, (HAVAYOCO, TAAKULO, CANDLE LIGHT, HIRDA) and the NGO Consortium. This analysis includes organisations that work in Somaliland regardless of if they operate in other parts of Somalia too.
It is worth mentioning that the disparity of capacities among LNGOs working in Somaliland is enormous, therefore comments below are not equally applicable to all LNGOs, but are rather a global picture of strengths and weaknesses of the sector. 
Attitudes.
• Most LNGOs working in Somaliland have development oriented values and they see humanitarian work as something ad-hoc, rather than at the core of their mandates.
• Some LNGOs have a substantial budget with enough stability from donors to allow them to take more initiative and an active role in humanitarian action.
• Most LNGOs have good enough financial procedures and accountability mechanisms.
• Diaspora provides regular income to LNGOs in Somaliland.
• Some organisations are willing to take a more proactive leadership role within the humanitarian sector.
• There is little clarity for most LNGOs on what are the implications of being a fully fledged humanitarian agency.
• Institutional values are mainly understood as instrumentalmanagerial values, such as transparency or efficiency.
Fundamental humanitarian values such as impartiality and independence do not emerge spontaneously.
• Some LNGO are instrumentalised financially by INGOs and used as implementing partners only.
• There is not local fundraising in Somaliland among business people, despite the growing opportunities emerging there.
• Diaspora community income is very little in percentage terms, (as an average, below 5% approximately).
• LNGOs' leadership is dominated by men, with the exception of Candlelight.
• There is a subordination attitude to INGOs and UN systems that blocks emerging LNGO leadership . 10. Governance and decision making.
11. Organisational structure and processes.
• Somaliland LNGOs are quick in doing needs assessments and responding to humanitarian crises, within their capacities.
• Most LNGOs have standard Strategic Plans.
• Several LNGOs have project administrative management capacity.
• Most organisations have formal governance and management structures in place.
• Most LNGOs have documented procedures on different areas: finances, HR, procurement etc.
• There is almost no logistical capacity at LNGO level.
• Decisions on response is delayed due to the hyper centralisation of decision making at Nairobi level by most INGOs and donors.
• LNGOs do not have emergency reserve funds or materials' stocks to allow them to respond quickly.
• Needs assessments done by LNGO are not used in most cases because it requires validation from Nairobi or metropolitan HQs.
• There is very limited capacity to conduct contextual analysis and strategizing.
• Programming is mostly based on donors' opportunities.
• M&E is embedded in most programmes but it seems to be a data collection process rather than a learning process.
• Few organisations have specific M&E units or specialised capacity.
• Knowledge management seems to be non-existent.
• Some LNGOs have mixed responsibilities between governance bodies and management leves. This affects accountability. 14. Advocacy.
15. Risk management.
16. Institutional resilience.
Gender Approach
2. Conflict sensitivity.
3. Rights based approach.
4. Connectedness, resilience & DRR.
HIV/AIDS.
• LNGOs have good networking capacity with Diaspora.
• Several LNGOs have websites and communications facilities making use of the good internet network available in Somaliland.
• A limited number of LNGO do have an advocacy agenda.
• A few LNGOs are powerful in moving ahead the gender agenda.
• Most LNGOs have a good understanding and practice of the conflict sensitiveness approach in humanitarian interventions.
• Several LNGOs work on development programs with a Resilience approach.
• Some LNGOs have developed some expertise in this area.
• Humanitarian networking among LNGOs is almost non-existent.
• LNGOs are not active participants in the NGO Consortium which is dominated by INGOs.
• Most LNGOs do not raise their concerns with INGOs or UN agencies due to fear of losing support.
• Institutional risk management does not seem to be a concern for LNGOS in Somaliland.
• Gender applied to humanitarian context is still a terrain to explore by LNGOs.
• Rights based approach is only adopted in practice by few organisations. Most LNGOs are oriented to a basic Needs based approach.
• There is not a systematic knowledge and implementation of DRR and resilience programmes.
• Almost totally ignored aspect by most humanitarian LNGOs working in Somaliland. 2. Financial capacity / autonomy.
3. Sustained investment and evolution.
4. Human resources available.
Geographical outreach.
• Almost all organisations have some practice in different sectors.
• Some LNGOs do have some staff trained in Sphere Standards.
• There are a good number of LNGOs in Somaliland that could play a bigger role in humanitarian responses.
• Some LNGOs have substantial annual budgets (above $1 Million).
• Volume of Human Resources available, staff contracted plus volunteers, is large in many LNGOs.
• Somaliland is geographically well covered by the numerous LNGOs present.
• There is almost no specialised sectoral capacity, although there are practical experiences developed by most LNGOs following the instructions of UN agencies and INGO.
• Lack of specialization does not seem to be perceived as an issue; on the contrary multisectoral interventions are proudly presented, despite the lack of expertise in most of the sectors.
• Sphere standards knowledge is very limited among LNGOs in Somaliland.
• Most LNGOs work on development programmes and have a reductionist emergency response approach to humanitarian interventions.
• There is a strong limitation on the availability of qualified people across the organisations.
• The eastern regions of Somaliland have less coverage due to security issues. 
PUNTLAND
Puntland is a disaster prone area affected by drought and some conflict, mainly in the State borders with Somaliland and South Central. Also cyclones affect the country.
Puntland operates as a member state of Somalia with a high degree of decentralisation of powers, that has translated into a quite vibrant dynamic and a proliferation of new ventures, such as universities, new businesses, as well as presence of local and International NGOs, etc.
Despite the political will to move into a "development phase", Puntland still has a significant number of its population requiring humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless as in other parts of Somalia, the humanitarian setting and its complex machinery together with the lack of trust among international and local actors, makes delivery of humanitarian aid very slow. As the director of HADMA said, "sometimes the rain comes before the humanitarian aid arrives." The overall humanitarian context analysis in Puntland provides this profile.
Organisational Humanitarian Capacities in Puntland
Humanitarian Affairs Disaster Management Agency (HADMA)
HADMA is the official agency set by the Puntland State Government to manage disasters. It was created after the Tsunami in 2005, and in 2011 it was equipped with a set of policies, strategies, contingency plans, response framework etc. On this front the theoretical framework of operations for HADMA is clear but it lacks resources to implement its mandate and strategies.
At the time of writing, HADMA deals with a regular budget of $4,500 per month and 16 staff of which seven have some humanitarian experience, skills or training. It does not have much logistical capacity and its means to coordinate is very limited. Nevertheless it tried hard in the last drought response in 2011 and the tropical cyclone of 2013,it has a certain degree of recognition within the rest of the humanitarian community.
Leadership is in the hands of a senior official and new generations are ready to take a more proactive role that could be very beneficial for HADMA.
Their capacity profile is as follows: Local NGOs in Puntland
Puntland local NGOs have their own specificities with some of them having developed significant humanitarian experience during the Tsunami 2004 response, although not all have translated that experience in capacity building of the humanitarian sector.
In summary this is the analysis of the Local NGOs operating in Puntland based on the interaction with several stakeholders, (ADESO, KAALO, ASAL, SFS, and other international actors). 2.Human resources.
Cluster
• Several LNGOs have developed a clear humanitarian mandate and abide to humanitarian principles. The engagement in the 2004 Tsunami response was a critical positive element for this.
• Some LNGOs like KAALO and INGOs like ADESO show leadership and can make a real contribution to promote the role of humanitarian NGOs in Puntland.
• Some LNGOs have a good financial volume and reliable systems of transparent financial management.
• Some diaspora young professionals are engaging with LNGOs in Puntland
• Most LNGOs do humanitarian work as a reactive component of their regular development projects.
• There are not humanitarian comprehensive strategies embedded in their mandates.
• Most LNGOs are driven by projects and donors' interests.
• Most of the LNGOs in Puntland do not have any degree of financial autonomy vis a vis INGOs or UN agencies.
• Turnover of staff in LNGOs is high, INGO and UN agencies drain some of the most qualified staff within LNGOs and local 9. Knowledge management.
10. Governance and decision making.
• Some LNGOs are able to move decisions quickly in terms of timely response.
• SFS is probably the most capable LNGO in terms of analysis and strategising capacity.
• Operational planning is done regularly by most LNGOs.
• Most LNGOs have enough expertise to manage projects.
• Some have M&E mechanisms in place.
• Governance structures, management structures and systems are in place in all Organisations met.
• Procedures are well developed and the support offered in this regard in the past years by organisations like Oxfam and CARE is paying back.
and their level of commitment, and professionalisation is high.
• With one exception none of the LNGOs have logistical capacity.
• The time required to make decisions and respond is largely dominated by the bureaucratic procedures and a lack of trust amongst the NGOs, UN agencies and its respective donors.
• There is a serious limitation of strategic critical analysis and thinking, which could overcome the project oriented view that most LNGO still have.
• Project Management and its M&E do not seem to match with a knowledge management system. There is no evidence on how knowledge is captured and used by LNGOs.
• Some NGOs have mixed Governance and management structures.
local government ( some of the best people are in international organisations but within the country). 14. Advocacy.
Institutional resilience
• There are some interesting Non State Actors fora in Puntland.
• The NGO consortium which is led by a member of KAALO creates a good basis for a future of more strategic coordination among LNGOs.
• LNGOs' communications capacities are good in Puntland.
• There is an emerging interest in developing a joint advocacy agenda.
• Organisations like SFS could play a leading role in this front.
• Some LNGOs have started to handover responsibilities to new generations which is very promising in terms of institutional evolution.
• Networking is mainly done on project related basis.
• Coordination among LNGOs is still very weak, compared to International coordination or LocalInternational coordination.
• There is a lack of joint advocacy agenda among LNGOs that initially could consider points such as:
• Accountability.
• Mutual support and cooperation.
• Local ownership in implementation of programmes.
• Recognition of role and capacities of LNGOs • Effective humanitarian coordination.
• LNGO management of leadership associated risks is good in contract with what happens in government structures. 2. Conflict sensitivity.
• Gender agenda has been picked up by most Puntland LNGOs.
• LNGOs are aware of conflict sensitiveness issues and manage this adequately.
• Rights based approach is adopted by several LNGOs and linked to governance programmes.
• Gender balance in decision making structures within LNGOs is not visible.
2.7
• There is not a mature debate between Rights based approach and Needs based approach when it comes to humanitarian in practice. 
HIV/AIDS
• Some limited humanitarian sectoral expertise is owned by few LNGOs.
• Knowledge of Sphere standard does exist with in some members of some LNGOs.
• Some LNGOs have enough capacity in terms of funds, human resources, geographical coverage to have enough critical mass to start leading a process of the humanitarian sector in Puntland
• Humanitarian programmes are embedded into development programmes.
• Some Organisations deal with HIV-AIDs.
• Specialised humanitarian sectoral competencies are not very high among Puntland LNGOs.
• There is no evidence that LNGOs do apply and monitor consistent implementation of Sphere Standards and other humanitarian standards in their humanitarian activities.
• Almost none of the LNGOs have enough logistical capacity to engage in major humanitarian response operations by themselves.
• There is not a clear setting for DRR and resilience programmes that will integrate humanitarian programmes with development programmes.
• HIV-AIDS does not emerge naturally as a component of the LNGOs programmes • Puntland State could be almost fully covered by LNGOs operating there.
• There are some gaps of access or coverage in the border conflict area with Somaliland.
1.8
2. 
SOMALI HUMANITARIAN PROFILE
Based on the aggregated organisational analysis and humanitarian context of the country, the Somali humanitarian profile could be described as follows: 
GLOBAL CONTEXT CAPACITIES IN SOMALI territories
Humanitarian crises in Somali Territories
• Each of the three described humanitarian areas (South Central, Somaliland and Puntland) have different humanitarian crises contexts and should be treated with specific and differentiated strategies (Drought and conflicts are the most relevant threats).
• Rural vulnerability will be gradually replaced by urban vulnerability in several parts of the country (Drought and conflict major threats, will be gradually replaced by unemployment and urban violence threats).
The understanding of humanitarianism
• These areas are still under an old paradigm of understanding humanitarian work as a "short intervention to feed bodies", rather than as full set of actions to save lives with dignity, reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and restore and protect rights of people affected by crises. • Stereotypes of high efficiency of external "parachuted" international interventions are still dominant in the humanitarian machinery operating with new emerging actors.
The humanitarian sector
• The humanitarian sector is fully dominated by UN agencies and international NGOs. • International actors' rhetoric of building humanitarian local capacity are in many cases empty of real content and reduced to a set of trainings and instrumentalisation of local NGOs which are subcontracted as implementers particularly in the most risky areas.
• This is correlated with the perception of accountability and standards required: while risk is transferred down to CBOs and LNGOs, accountability and quality requirements remain invariable, despite the hard context in which some LNGOs and most CBOs have to operate. • INGOs are still acting under the assumption that to be influential, power must be achieved by an aggressive growth strategy. This behaviour provokes a funding competition amongst INGOs and Local NGOs. This is often used by large donors to drive their own agenda through the lure of funding.
• When it comes to programme delivery there is an immoral cascade of transfer of risk from UN Agencies down to community level, while quality is claimed to be always higher at UN and international level.
This can be visualised as follows:
It is assumed by doors and internatiional actors that as risk increases (size of bubbles), quality and accountability shrinks. So most interantional actors and donors prefer to work in the safe areas, (even if this has a clear impact on not saving lives), rather than working in the most difficult environments with risky and complex humanitarian access, which is "reserved" for LNGOs and CBOs. 
Humanitarian responsibilities
Local Humanitarian Capacity Objectives and Indicators
The analysis presented above and related recommendations could generate a broad set of objectives in terms of humanitarian capacities to be achieved. Intentionally this has been reduced to a limited number of key objectives and indicators/milestones in order to make it manageable, understandable and straight forward in its monitoring.
This set of objectives and indicators are presented globally and should be adjusted in every geographical area in order to ensure they are contextualised and owned by local actors. This should be done by the stakeholders who will own the process and take into account the recommendations. 2.4 LNGOs and SGAs increased the quality and speed of their needs' assessments using recognised humanitarian standards and these assessments are accepted by international stake holders.
Objectives
2.5 Decision makers give up the comfort zone of requiring more and more hard data before initiating a response, and accept reasonable degrees of uncertainty inherent to the context and complexities of humanitarian crisis in the territories.
